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Maui, the second largest of the Hawaiian Islands, grew from two
volcanoes. These are the older, deeply eroded West Maui mountains,
and the younger, only recent dormant Haleakala. At the summit of
Haleakala is a vast crater which has long attracted scientists and
the general public to its volcanic, ethnographic and botanical riches.
When in 1916 Congress sought to preserve Hawaii's outstanding
features, it included an area of over 21,000 acres at the summit of
Haleakala in the new Hawaii National Park. The highest point at
the summit is 10,023 feet-
The objectives of the National Park Service and those of other
Federal agencies are often in conflict. Because of its geographical
location, these conflicts were particularly noticeable in Hawaii
National Park during and following World War II. The summit of
Haleakala was especially attractive to the military organizations
because it contained easily accessible, undeveloped, Federal land.
As the military planners tend to overlook time, money and aesthetic
intangibles in the name of current defense necessity, to maintain
any Park values, the National Park Service has been repeatedly
obliged to thwart, delay and return via proper channels the frequent
military plans for Haleakala. The National Park Service was thus in
the unpopular position of opposing programs the military claimed
were absolutely vital for the national defense.
The September 10, 1945 issue of Time magazine carried on article
claiming that the National Park Service had delayed the installation
of important radar devices at Haleakala, thereby aiding the Japanese
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attack. Hawaii National Park Superintendent Edward G. Wingate
prepared a memorandum for Associate National Park Service
Director Demaray detailing the facts in the matter.1 They make
interesting reading. This chronological record covers correspondence
from July 18, 1940 through February 1, 1943.
In brief, the Army sought sites on both Haleakala and Mauna
Loa for "unspecified defense installations." A "thorough" study was
referred to, but only the very tops of both peaks were surveyed. It
was determined that the "two sites selected in the National Park
offer the only sites which are suitable for these proposed defense
purposes." The National Park sites were "not only the most suitable
but also the only acceptable sites." The Mauna Loa site was approved
by the National Park Service for Army use in November 1940, but
no work was ever done there by the Army.
The Haleakala location, atop Red Hill, had been scheduled for
development in the Park's water system. The National Park Service
recommended a site just outside the Park, on Kolekole peak, with
more level ground and even better visibility, but for unspecified
reasons this was rejected by the Army and a restudy of the Haleakala
summit produced no new sites. The Army still wanted Red Hill and
sought the withdrawal of several acres there for the "defense installa-
tion," plus additional acreage lower down the slope for a support
camp
By April 1941, the War and Interior Departments had worked
out an agreement for the use of the area. A Special Use Permit was
signed on April 29, 1941, covering a six acre installation site at Red
Hill, and the Army agreed to use for its base camp the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC) camp at the 7,000 foot elevation which
would be vacated by the CCC in May 1941. Work soon began on
a road extension up to Red Hill and on a steel tower at the summit.
A water catchment dam, of unauthorized size and location, was
started. The Red Hill installation, however, was not operational on
December 7, 1941, some seven months after approval for the work
had been granted by the National Park Service; and the new
telephone line to Red Hill was not even started until January 1942.
Army Engineers finally completed the installation of all Army
equipment at Red Hill in May 1942.
The Aircraft Warning Service System (AWS) thus constructed
was operated intermittently until March 1943 when the facility was
abandoned except for a few guards to protect the property. It was
abandoned because it didn't work. The 360 degree clear line allowed
radar signals to bounce back to the station from 360 degrees,
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causing a confusing "echo." Later radar sites were located so as to
minimize the echo by placing them against a solid background.
Haleakala, closed on December 7, 1941, was partially re-opened
to the public in October 1942, and completely opened for public
day use on February 1, 1943.
In November 1943, the Army again approached Superintendent
Wingate for permission to construct a communication station at
Red Hill. The Army assumed that there would be no problem as
there was already a Special Use Permit for the desired area, and
the agreement was between two agencies of the Federal government.
Wingate again sought assurance that Red Hill was the only suitable
site, and that the installation was not permanent. He suggested that
the new request be processed through regular channels.
It soon became clear that the Army considered this new project
a continuation of the previously abandoned AWS and thus, in effect,
already approved. For its part, the National Park Service saw a
new, permanent, unauthorized installation which, if allowed, might
be merely the beginning of additional requests. The Army began
actual construction at Red Hill in April 1944, five months after
contacting Wingate, but still without having applied for authoriza-
tion from the Interior Department. When told by Park Service
personnel that such activity had not been approved, the Army
indicated that they intended to go ahead with the work, and would
tear it all down again should Washington disapprove. The heavy
construction at Red Hill was damaging the site. The peak had
already been leveled off, thereby reducing Maui's highest elevation
by several feet. A new brick power house and another large brick
building were going up although the work stopped for a time midway
when the supply of bricks ran out. Most distressing of all were the
90-foot radio poles with red lights atop, soon dubbed the "Haleakala
National Forest." All of this was presented as "essential to the
successful prosecution of the war in this area." [In April 1944, the
Allies had successfully concluded the naval battles at Midway and
the Philippine Sea, and the landings at Guadalcanal and Kwajalein.
Nevertheless, General Richardson, Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department, testified in a habeas corpus case on April 11,
1944, that the Japanese were still capable of attacking Hawaii
either from air or from the sea]. None of the construction conformed
to the provisions of the Special Use Permit of April 29, 1941.
The problem soon reached the Departmental level. On October
24, 1944, Secretary of War Stimson wrote Secretary of Interior
Fortas asking for a new permit to replace the old one for Red Hill.
There was, as justification for this latest assault on the Park, a
"military necessity" for the construction and operation of a "Radio
Station" there. A permanent permit would not be possible, replied
Fortas, but one for the "duration and six months" might be worked
out. The permanency of the installation was the key point, and the
War Department indicated that it was preparing a report. If it were
to be permanent, the land would have to be removed from the
Park by Congressional action, a time-consuming process.
Even the withdrawal of the desired acreage would not really solve
the problem. Superintendent Wingate visited Haleakala in December
1944 and reported on the damage. He felt that the installation was
clearly of a permanent nature, and it was very visible from both
inside and outside the crater; no amount of boundary legislation
could remove the eyesore. "And it is all unnecessary in this particular
spot," wrote Wingate to the Director.2
Nevertheless, it remained. A revised Special Use Permit for the
Red Hill site was signed on April 11, 1945. It authorized the use of
the area for a "communication station for a period not to exceed 6
months after the war."
Two months later, on June 19, 1945, Haleakala section Ranger-
in-charge Frank J. Hjort, submitted a report to Superintendent
Wingate on Army activities in the Haleakala section. The Pukaoao
Observatory, a building the Army occassionally claimed as its own,
had again been cleared of radio equipment. The Red Hill station
was very prominently in operation, and an installation on Kolekole
peak was operating, also staffed from the base camp at the old CCG
site at Puu Nianiau. The Red Hill facility apparently required a
clear line-of-sight with stations on the other islands. A number of
sites along the south-west rift beyond Kolekole would seem to have
served this purpose equally well, and it was generally felt that the
Army had chosen Red Hill merely because "they already had shacks
there." For this reason, and because Red Hill was an integral part
of the Crater of Haleakala from both a scenic and geological point
of view, withdrawal of this area from the National Park would not
be an acceptable solution. Hjort suggested bargaining the withdrawal
of the Puu Nianiau camp area from the National Park in exchange
for Army withdrawal from Red Hill at the end of the war. Although
the Special Use Permit the War Department had signed was only
for the "duration and six months," Park personnel thought that
they recognized a permanent installation no matter what the Army
called it.
On August 14, 1945 the war was over; in March 1946 the six
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months were up and the Army had evacuated the base camp at Puu
Nianiau. Red Hill was not mentioned. In September 1946, Francis
Oberhansley, who had replaced Wingate as Superintendent the
previous July, wrote to the Commanding General, MIDPAC, about
the ownership of property within the Haleakala section of the Park.
Oberhansley suggested the Army consider transfer of the stripped
physical plant at Puu Nianiau in lieu of a complete restoration of
the site. Under any circumstances, he wrote, technical equipment
should be removed immediately as there was no security and things
were disappearing. In April 1947, the Army Engineers agreed to
return the base camp at Puu Nianiau. There was still no mention
of the Red Hill installation in this exchange.
On March 15, 1948, two years beyond the "duration and six
months" specified in the Special Use Permit, Superintendent
Oberhansley sent a memorandum to the Director of National Park
Service Region Four, saying that the station was inoperative due to
lack of power—the line was down and the standby generator ruined
by freezing. Rumored plans were for the Army to abandon the
Red Hill station as of March 15. If this were true, Oberhansley
suggested the National Park Service take immediate steps to hold
the Army strictly to the terms of the Special Use Permit in the
matter of site restoration. Once gone, the Army was thought unlikely
to return for any site restoration work.
The concern was premature. The site, reported the Army on
April 2, was indeed being abandoned as a radar station, but now
the Air Force needed it for "highly classified" equipment.
Once again, the Park Superintendent asked for details of the
nature of this new installation, its permanency, and the reasoning by
which the Air Force, already installed on Kolekole, sought a new
site on Red Hill. The Army replied with a detailed background
analysis of the prior "joint use" of Red Hill by the Army and Air
Force, and the now usual insistance that the Air Force had a
"definite need" for Red Hill for the installation of new, highly
classified equipment.
In May 1948, Superintendent Oberhansley visited Haleakala and
found that the Army, Air Force, and the Mutual Telephone Com-
pany all had eyes on the Red Hill location. Park policy would not
allow approval of any use of this site if it were not necessary for
immediate national defense, especially when other sites were avail-
able. The Air Force did not come in, but the Army continued to
claim the site for standby purposes. Even the installation of a new
telephone line to serve the developing Kolekole facilities did not
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seem to obviate the necessity of retaining the obsolete, de-activated
"communication" structure on Red Hill.
The Superintendent's Report for June 1950 finally reported the
Red Hill barracks razed and salvaged, and all 13 poles of the
"Haleakala National Forest" removed for use at the Kihei signal
station.
The restoration was not permanent. During the "Korean Con-
flict," the Special Use Permit of April 11, 1945 was extended by
the Secretary of the Interior on October 24, 1950 to allow the Air
Force to continue its "temporary use" of the Red Hill site until six
months after the termination of hostilities. On October 22, 1953
the Air Force declared its entire Haleakala installation "excess" and
entered negotiations with the National Park Service for its disposal.
The military, however, balked at site restoration, and the National
Park Service refused to take over the buildings.
Early in 1955, with the future of Red Hill still unsettled, the
University of Hawaii joined the petitioners. They sought the Air
Force buildings on Red Hill for use as a "geophysical observatory."
In a letter dated January 14, 1955, the Director of National Park
Service Region Four warned the Director of the National Park
Service of this proposed University of Hawaii installation. The
buildings at Red Hill were an eyesore, and once established there,
it was very likely the facility would wish to expand its operations.
He further pointed out that a similar Weather Bureau project on
Mauna Loa was not functioning. The University, however, was given
permission to use the site in April for a "coronograph" study.
In July the Air Force was again talking of long term use, instead
of the six months they originally proposed during the upcoming
nuclear testing. In December, the Navy was using the old Air Force
installations, the nature of the project not known to the National
Park Service. In January 1956, the Air Force was using the buildings,
but vacated the site in August and most of the buildings were
removed. In February 1958 the Air Force again requested the use
of Red Hill for two months, later extended to four months, and the
National Park Service granted the request. The Air Force used
trailers and the remaining Red Hill buildings; there was no new
construction.
The final military threat to Red Hill came from the Hawaii Air
National Guard (HANG). Public Law 86-149 of August 10, 1959
authorized the construction of 2 HANG radar stations for the defense
of the Islands. During May 1959 the Air Force, with some HANG
officers, undertook an on-the-ground investigation of the Haleakala
summit area without bothering to contact the National Park Service.
(They expressed indignation when the Service protested.) There
were rumors of a large, new Red Hill base, but when queried in
August, the Air Force reported that nothing had been decided on
the size or location of any new camp, and they also admitted that
the Special Use Permit for the use of Red Hill had expired. In a
letter dated August 3, 1959, the Air Force advised the Interior
Department that the HANG had been instructed "that they shall
take no action such as preparation of plans until complete agreement
of the National Park Service has been obtained." However, there
were plans already prepared to put the necessary large towers outside
the Park with the support buildings in the Red Hill hollow. The
National Park Service pointed out that if the towers could go outside
the Park, the entire project could go outside the Park. The Interior
Department wrote the Secretary of the Air Force, Dudley G. Sharp,
on December 30, 1959, outlining the National Park Service position
on such intrusive and discordant developments. The Air Force was
asked to review its plans. "If this cannot be done and no other
possible alternative can be found, we are agreeable to a re-examina-
tion."3
Pressure was then applied to the Hawaii State Government
through senators Hiram Fong, Oren Long, and later, Dan Inouye,
and Hawaii Governor William Quinn. It was threatened that if the
first choice Haleakala site was not approved, additional funds would
be needed. In that case, the entire project ran the risk of being
delayed or scrapped entirely, with a heavy loss of military spending
in Hawaii. Quinn recognized three national policies in conflict:
preservation of National Parks; adequate defense for Hawaii; and
budgetary limitations. He preferred to bend the budgetary one first,
and asked the Congressmen for additional information.
Then on May 12, 1960, Robert Hiatt, Dean and Director of
Research at the University of Hawaii, wrote HANG's General
Valentine Sieferman. Hiatt had a number of questions on the opera-
tion of the proposed radar equipment and how it might effect the
University's research program at Kolekole. "It is our considered
opinion that radioastronomy . . . would be impossible on Haleakala
with the radar station on either Red Hill or Kolekole. At the National
Radio Observatory at Green Bank, West Virginia, no low powered
radio transmitters of any kind are allowed within 50 miles."4 The
Hawaiian Astronomical Society at its meeting May 3, 1960, went
on record opposing a radar tracking station at Haleakala and Quinn
asked if the Air Force had checked out this possible problem.
Local commercial broadcasters also expressed concern and the
Air Force prepared agreements with several stations to guarantee no
interference, and to close the station until any interference was
eliminated [!]—except in case of national emergency.
In the face of this opposition, the Air Force turned its consideration
to its third choice site on Kolekole peak. (Their second choice was
White Hill, lower than Red Hill, but still within the Park.) In a
letter to Quinn dated April 13, 1960 Sieferman noted that until
recently HANG had insisted that Red Hill was the only feasible
site, but recent technical advances "will make it feasible to locate
this equipment at the alternate site [ie, Kolekole]."
This new Air Force interest in Kolekole produced an even more
vigorous response from the University scientists. Hiatt wrote to
Governor Quinn (via Senator Fong) asking no hasty action on the
Kolekole site and saying radar was incompatible with the obser-
vatory. "Moreover, it is highly doubtful that any scientific activity
can be carried on anywhere at the summit with the radar unit in
operation." A great deal of money had already been spent on the
Observatory, he said, and more was being appropriated. "The fact
that Kolekole Peak is the third choice of the Air National Guard
indicates that other sites might be sought to serve about as well and
still not effect or eradicate existing activities in Hawaii. In any
event, full scale investigation should be made before any change
occurs in the activities on Haleakala."5
Through the summer of 1960, the scientific community at the
University and their financial supporters at the National Science
Foundation and the Smithsonian Institute continued to express
"deep concern" over the proposed installation of radar on the summit
of Haleakala. A meeting in November, however, produced some
changes. A letter dated November 15, 1960 from the Department of
Defense to the National Science Foundation reported: "Dr. Hiatt
agreed that if the Air Force radar is installed on Red Hill, which is
approximately 1,800 feet from the University facility, that this will
be satisfactory."6 This figure is not quite the 50 miles Hiatt had
mentioned in May. The National Park Service no longer had the
support of the University scientists in opposing the HANG radar
station on Red Hill.
The Air Force position was summed up in a letter from Brigadier
General Chickering, USAF, dated January 17, 1961. He claimed
that the Air Force had planned since 1948 to reactivate Red Hill
and had only been waiting new, improved radar equipment and
funds for the construction of the facility. Congress had approved the
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project and provided the funds in 1959 [ n years later.] Objections
by broadcasting stations and the University of Hawaii-Smithsonian
Institute Observatory had been resolved. "Exhaustive" surveys
showed this was the best single radar site. When NPS Director
Conrad Wirth had toured Haleakala in early January 1960, ex-
plaining to the Air Force the National Park Service policy on in-
holdings, the Air Force had clarified its position for him. "This
admirable principle is fully understandable," said Chickering,
"except when applied at the expense of national defense and survival."
Director Wirth then mentioned National Park Service plans for
the development of Red Hill and the Air Force had suggested com-
bining the facilities. The Service, however, reported Chickering,
stubbornly insisted on going ahead with "unilateral" plans for the
development of Red Hill. In the interest of economy "and to prevent
construction of permanent Park Service facilities [in a National
Park] incompatible with defense requirements," Ghickering re-
quested immediate action by the Executive, or by Court order if
necessary, to suspend further planning until the USAF request for
use of the site had been resolved.7 At about the same time Secretary
of the Interior Seaton wrote the Defense Department noting that
other agencies with site requirements based on "extreme urgency"
had been turned down, and had found other locations outside the
Park.
Local agencies delayed action until the problem could be solved
in Washington. On April 26, 1961, Hiatt wrote Congressmen Inouye
and Long saying that Director Wirth still opposed Red Hill and
recommended Kolekole. Wrote Hiatt: "As you know we settled the
matter of mutual habitation on Haleakala by having the Depart-
ment of Defense agree to put the radar installation on Red Hill,
which is higher and better for their purposes, and the University to
put its observatory on Kolekole Peak. This agreement was arranged
at the highest level of the Department of Defense, the National
Science Foundation which is sponsoring the University's observatory,
and the Smithsonian Institution, which, with the University, operates
one of the twelve United States Satellite tracking stations immediate-
ly adjacent to Kolekole Peak." The National Park Service, adminis-
trator of the area, was not included in this settlement of mutual
habitation. Any change in plans, said Hiatt, could result in the
loss of the tracking station, the observatory project, and assorted
National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) funds.
Hiatt asked that the Congressmen insist the radar go on Red Hill
as originally planned and that the National Park Service be asked
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to take a more reasonable attitude on the "highest and best use of
those few acres of barren land on one corner of their vast holdings
on the summit of Haleakala."8 Inouye brought this problem to the
attention of Director Wirth who pointed out that Congress had
already decided the "highest and best use of those few barren acres"
by making them part of a National Park.
All interested agencies agreed to have the University on Kolekole
and the HANG radar station on Red Hill; all, that is, except the
National Park Service which had not been consulted and whose
objections were discounted as based on mere aesthetics which could
hardly stand before the fact of national defense necessity. Moreover,
the Red Hill proponents insisted the radar station wouldn't seriously
detract from the vista.
Congress, however, by Act of September 13, 1960, had established
a separate National Park of the Haleakala section of Hawaii National
Park, and the new Haleakala National Park included the peak of
Red Hill.
In January 1962, Governor Quinn asked the Air Force about the
radar site, specifically asking if the Haleakala location had not been
abandoned in favor of one on Oahu. On January 3, 1962, he wrote
to Senator Fong saying that effort should be spent promoting a
joint-use facility with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
on Mt. Kaala on Oahu, rather than trying to obtain the Haleakala
site. A few days later the Air Force announced they had abandoned
plans for a radar station on Haleakala.
Some background for this reversal may be found in a letter from
Haleakala Superintendant Stratton to the Director of National Park
Service Region Four, dated September 12, 1961. It detailed a
meeting that day during which Governor Quinn was informed by
General Sieferman that the requirements of Red Hill was "budge-
tary." Quinn thereupon withdrew his support of the military use
of Red Hill. On October 18, 1961, Regional Director Merriam
wrote to Hawaii Volcanoes National Park Superintendent Johnston
that as far as the Secretary of the Interior was concerned, the Red
Hill issue was to be considered dead.
The HANG radar station was eventually built on Mt. Kaala.
The Red Hill site was turned back to the National Park Service
under an excess property declaration, and a tourist facility built
thereon. Although construction of the Red Hill Observatory
eliminated requests for permanent installations, the site is still
desirable for temporary military use. In September 1965 the Depart-
ment of Defense requested the use of the area from 15 September to
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15 December for a satellite tracking station. This request was
granted. A note of thanks was received for the use of the Observatory
site, and the Park staff noted that the site had been returned in
perfect condition. Other groups have also had short term permits
to use the Red Hill location for scientific programs. These installa-
tions did not always meet with approval from "Science City"
neighbors. The Director of the University's Haleakala Observatory
on one occasion wrote the Superintendent of Haleakala National
Park to ask that the Observatory please be advised of any future
permits so summit activities could be coordinated. They had just
recently had to ask another group to lower its antenna so as not to
interfere with the Observatory. "Science City" was becoming
crowded.
The Puu Nianiau base camp, later used by a Park concessioner,
was vacated in late 1961 and these buildings then became desirable
in the eyes of various Federal agencies seeking facilities on Haleakala.
To forestall requests for the use of the site, the National Park Service
asked the General Services Administration to initiate action for the
removal of the structures early in 1962. Before a contract could be
awarded, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) requested the
buildings for staff housing during Operation Dominic, scheduled for
later in the year. The Superintendent at Haleakala National Park
refused the request on policy grounds and the AEC then made
application through the Department of Defense. There was stong
feeling on all levels of the National Park Service that there should
be no new precedent-making arrangements of this sort with sister
Federal agencies. Although the AEC produced arguments which
suggested their requirements were based on convenience rather than
need, a six month Special Use Permit was issued on February 26,
1962. The AEC was to use the existing buildings for room and board
only, and were to vacate no later than September 1, 1962. On
August 8, 1962, Superintendent Stratton at Haleakala wrote the
Director of the Western Regional Office: "It will come as no surprise
to you that the AEC has this date requested an extension of the
permit for use of the former Silver Sword Inn in Haleakala National
Park."9 Operation Dominic was scheduled for completion by the end
of the year and the AEC was granted a new permit to run through
December 31, 1962. It was strongly urged that the buildings be
razed as soon after the AEC had vacated as was possible; the
Department of Defense had other installations scheduled for Kolekole,
and private organizations were again asking about the area for
group camping. The AEC vacated the area in November, turned
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over some housekeeping supplies to the Park at no cost, and the old
CCC camp-World War II base camp-concessioner Inn buildings
were finally removed. The area has been vacant since then, with
only shops and stables remaining in the vicinity.
As early as May 1962 the FAA had requested the use of the same
area for its new its new facility at the 7,000 foot level. Superintendent
Stratton again replied that such developments were against policy
and pointed out that earlier use of the area had been military or
defense oriented. The FAA then asked for access to a housing site
beyond the Inn area just outside the Park on Haleakala Ranch land.
This would still have required tapping the Park water and power
lines, and would make closing out the Inn buildings that much
more difficult. The Park has only a limited supply of water which at
times required rationing to cover staff and visitor needs. Petitioning
agencies rarely questioned the water or power supply, assuming that
both were readily available.
The request was finally denied when it again became clear that
the site decision was based on convenience and economy rather than
unique need. The FAA finally agreed to a site location just outside
the Park, near the Hosmer Grove picnic area, but within the section
once proposed for the Keanae addition. The National Park Service
granted the FAA a Revocable Use Permit for 20 years, dated
December 22, 1964, for a power line across the Park. A new permit
was issued in 1966 to accommodate changes in alignment of the
underground power cable. The FAA troposcat tower was completed
in the summer of 1965.
There are now no non-Park installations on the summit of
Haleakala or elsewhere within the Park boundaries, but the adjacent
summit area around Kolekole peak, just outside the Park and at
present accessible only through the Park, has been developed as
"Science City." In some quarters it is known as the "scientific
slum." It is readily visible from many locations outside the Park, but
cannot be seen from within the crater. Science City and the FAA
troposcat tower located just outside the Park boundary at the 7,000
foot elevation, are both serviced from Wailuku and Kahului. At
the present time, the only access to either site is via the State Highway
and Park Highway to the summit of Haleakala.
NOTES
Two files provide most of the source material for this report. They are: National
Park Service-Hawaii National Park file: 601-05.1, hereafter cited as HNP;
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and, Archives of Hawaii, Governor's Files-Quinn, Defense, Haleakala Radar
Site, hereafter cited as AH.
1
 HNP, September 14, 1945.
2
 HNP, December 7, 1944.
3 AH, December 30, 1959.
4
 AH, May 12, 1960.
5
 AH, April 27, 1960.
6
 AH, November 15, 1960.
7
 AH, January 17, 1961.
8
 AH, April 26, 1961.
» NPS-HNP file: 30, August 8, 1962.
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